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OF POSIN AND PIGS, OF COASE AND COST,
OF PROFITS GAINED AND OPPORTUNITIES
LOST
STEPHEN MARKSt

I.

INTRODUCTION

In his article, "The Coase Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly,"'
Professor Daniel Posin purports to demonstrate that the Coase
Theorem fails because it incorrectly accounts for opportunity
costs. This short paper will demonstrate that there is a mistake
in the example Posin uses to prove his assertion. Although the
mistake is a small one, it completely drives his result. In fact,
after correcting the mistake, Posin's example corroborates, rather
than refutes, the Coase Theorem.
The Coase Theorem is provocative. Beyond the small point
discussed herein, there are many questions as to what the
theorem really means and as to which of the many interpretations are reasonable or correct. I do not mean to imply here
that because Posin's refutation is wrong, that any particular
interpretation of the Coase Theorem is correct. My intent is to
clear up one simple misunderstanding.
II.

THE MODEL

Let us begin with a very simple set of equations that define
costs and revenues of cattle and pony production:

t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A.
University of California, Irvine 1974; M.A. Economics, University of California,
Berkeley 1977; J.D. University of California, Berkeley 1978; Ph.D. Economics,
University of California, Berkeley 1981. I would like to thank Mary Ellen
Ehrenreich and Carmela Correale for their help.

1. 37 WAYNE L. REv. 89 (1991).
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Number of cattle (and cattle inputs) = u
Number of ponies (and pony inputs) = v
Resource constraint: u + v : 110
Total revenue of cattle = TRc = 550u
Total (production) cost of cattle = TO =

U2 + U3

20

60

Total revenue of ponies = TRp = 200v
Total cost of ponies = TCp =

Total cost of crop damage

V2 + V3

20

60

= TCD = U2+U

8

18

The symbols u and v track the resources used in such
activity. Note that these functions are consistent with Posin's
assumptions. 2 This can be seen by taking derivatives:

Marginal revenue of cattle = MRc = 550
2
Marginal (production) cost of cattle = MCc = -u-- +u
10 20
Marginal revenue of ponies = MRp = 200

Marginal cost of ponies
Marginal cost of crop damage

=

2
MCp = __ + V
10 20

= MCr=U +

4

U2

6

Since these functions are identical to Posin's, 3 the results
should be identical no matter how one solves the problem.
From these cost and revenue functions we can derive profit

2. The functions ignore fixed costs which are irrelevant. Posin does the
same in his profit calculations. See, e.g., Posin, supra note 1, at 113 n.30, where
he calculates profits by taking the integral. This ignores fixed costs. The above
profit functions were in fact derived through integration. Also note that we use
u and v for cattle and ponies, respectively, to avoid confusion.
3. See Posin, supra note 1, at 94-97, 104-05.
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functions for the rancher of raising cattle only with no farmer
(or, equivalently, with no liability and no side payments), ponies
only, cattle and ponies jointly with no farmer, (or, equivalently,
with no liability and no side payments) and cattle and ponies
jointly with liability for damage to the farmer:
Total profit of cattle only with no farmer
(or with no liability and no side payments):
TP = 550u- (2 +
Total profit of ponies only:

TPp=200v- 120 +6-5
Total profit of joint production with no farmer
(or with no liability and no side payments):
TPNF =55Ou - (u2
u3)
\20 + 60/

+200v -

120

601

Total profit of joint production with liability for crop damage:
TPL = 550u -

20 + U3

+200v- (A+
(2060)20

(3

60H 8

+

181

Using differential calculus, we can maximize each of the
above profit functions subject to the constraint that u+v is
less than or equal to 110. This was done and the best whole
number result was found by rounding in the appropriate (maximizing) direction.
Although calculus is used to find the answers, we can get an
intuitive grasp by simply substituting into the profit functions. Using
the total profit functions we can see that some of Posin's results are
correct and others are incorrect. Table I lists the profits of the
rancher of raising cattle alone with no famer (Table 1 also gives the
profits of the rancher if there is a farmer but there is no liabilty and
there are no side payments).
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TABLE 1: RAISING CATTLE wiTH No FARMER
(or, equivalently, with no liability and no side payments)
u
103
104
105

TP c
37907
37911
37905

Profits are maximized at u= 104 as Posin suggested. 4 Now consider the profits of the rancher of raising ponies alone with no
farmer.
TABLE 2: RAIsiNG PoNIES
v
60
61
62
63

TPP
8220
8231
8236
8234

Profits are maximized at v=62 as Posin suggested. 5 At this point,
it should be clear that these are the same functions as Posin used.
The problem arises when we combine cattle and pony production.
Table 3 gives the profits of raising cattle and ponies jointly with no
farmer (Table 3 also gives the profits of the rancher if there is a
farmer but there is no liability and there are no side payments).
TABLE 3: RAISING CATrLE AND PoNiEs wTrH No FARMER
(or equivalently, with no liability and no side payments)
u
83

v
27

TPNF
40811

85
86
87

25
24
23

40862
40870
40867

Profits are maximized at u = 86. Posin suggests that after u = 83
all further inputs should go toward producing ponies. 6 This, however,
does not account for the fact that the marginal profit of pony

4. Id. at 95.

5. Id. at 98-99.
6. Id.at 102-03.
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production also falls. In other words, at this point both cattle
production and pony production should be increased at a rate that
equals their marginal profits. This should continue until the input
constraint is met or until marginal profits become zero (in our
example, the constraint is met before marginal profits reach zero).
If we were to operate at u = 83 we would be giving up profits. The
problem is more vivid in the following example.
Consider the profit of joint production if there is a farmer and
if the cattle rancher must pay damages.
TABLE

4: RAISiNG CATTE AND PONs wrm LiABmITY TO FAEMER
u

v

TPL

39

71

24882

48
49
50

=62
6160-

-

26245
26264
26255

Profits are maximized at u=49. Posin suggests that profits are
maximized at u=39,7 but this would result in suboptimal profits for
the rancher. Again, these values are obtained simply by substituting
into the profit function and can be easily verified.
Finally, note that the values in the above table also are net social
benefit (NSB). Maximum net social benefit occurs at u=49 as the
following table indicates:
TABLE 5: NET SociAL BE=qrT oF RASING CAmE AND PoNIES
u
48
49
50

v
62
61
60

TP
32677
33100
33512

TCD
6432
6836
7257

26245
26264
26255

86

24

40870

36261

4609

NSB

This table also shows that, absent transaction costs and problems
of strategic play, the farmer and the rancher should be able to reach

7. Id. at 108-10.
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a settlement. We have already proved the following statements:
1. With no liability and no side payments, the rancher
will produce at u =86.
2. With liability and no side payments, the rancher will
produce at u=49.
In the absence of bargaining, the allocation of the right makes
a difference. With efficient bargaining and the possibility of side
payments, however, we get the following:
1. With no liability, the farmer could profitably pay the
rancher to produce at u =49 rather than at u = 86, because
the gain to the farmer is greater than the loss to the rancher
(see Table 5: farmer saves $29,425.00 in crop damage while
rancher loses $7,770.00 in profits). Thus, the farmer could
easily compensate the rancher for losses.
2. With liability, the farmer could not profitably pay the
rancher for a change in the production level of cattle from
u=49, because any move costs the rancher more than it
benefits the farmer (see Table 5: any move from u=49 costs
rancher more than farmers saves).
Under either allocation of the right, the result is u =49 if there
is costless bargaining and no stragic play. The actual amount of the
side payment is indeterminate within certain limits; however, the
outcome in terms of cattle is not. Any bargain with production other
than u=49 is dominated by a different bargain that leaves both the
rancher and the farmer better off. In other words, the pie is largest
at u=49 and the only issue is how to divide it. I merely repeat
Coase's argument, but we can see it applies in Posin's example.
III.

WHERE

DiD PoslN Go

WRONO?

The above answers were obtained using differential calculus and
then rounding in the appropriate (maximizing) direction. The calculations are straightforward and not presented here.' Differential calculus is simply another form of marginal analysis. Thus, if marginal
analysis is used correctly it should, and does, yield the same results.
However, we must be careful. Suppose that the rancher is raising

8. Perhaps the easiest way to solve these constrained maximization problems is through the use of Lagrange multipliers.

1991]

OPPORTUNITIES LOST

ponies alone. The number of ponies raised, as we saw, is 62 and the
profit made is $8,236.00. (See Table 2.) Now suppose that we start
raising cattle. What are the opportunity cost in terms of foregone
pony production? First note that we can raise up to 48 cattle without
foregoing any profits from pony production. However, if we produce
49 cattle then we must produce one less pony. The amount of pony
profit foregone is the difference between $8,236.00 and $8,231.00.
That is, the opportunity cost in terms of foregone pony production
of producing 49 units rather than 48 units of cattle is $5.00. Another
way to put this is that the marginal opportunity cost in terms of
foregone pony production of producing the forty-ninth unit of cattle
is $5.00. (Note that this is a far cry from $200.00 claimed by Posin.)
Futhermore, we can note that the marginal opportunity cost of
foregone pony production is not constant. For example, if we increase
cattle production to 50 units, then we must reduce pony production
to 60 units. The profit from producing 60 ponies is $8,220.00, or
$11.00 less than producing 61 ponies. We thus say that the marginal
opportunity cost in terms of foregone pony production increase.
In general, the amount of total opportunity cost in terms of
foregone pony production is:
(0

, if u ;48

Total opportunity costs= 0
8236 - [200(1 10-u) - (110-u 2 - (110-u)3] , ifu > 48

The expression in the square bracket is just the profit of pony
production at reduced levels. Thus if cattle production is u = 100 then
the expression in the bracket is the profit earned by producing 10
ponies. The entire expression is the profit lost by foregoing some
pony production in order to produce cattle. That is, it is the total
opportunity cost in terms of foregone pony production for various
levels of cattle production. To find the marginal opportunity cost we
take the derivative. This yields:

Marginal opportunity costs =

(

,if u!48

0

200- 110.u _ (110-u)2 ,if u > 48

10

20
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This expression should replace the 200 Posin used. 9 It makes the
problem a bit more difficult to compute but it does yield the correct
results as use of the profit functions can verify. 0 The Coase Theorem,
under the assumptions of the example, remains intact.
Again, I emphasize that although Posin's refutation of the
Coase Theorem is wrong, I do not imply that any particular
interpretation of the Coase Theorem is correct. However, it is
worth making one small point: marginal analysis is a tool that (1)
helps solve maximization (or minimization) problems, and (2) gives
some understanding about the nature of the solution. Setting
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, or marginal social benefit
equal to marginal social cost, is not a goal in itself, either for the
firm or for the social planner. The goal is to maximize profit (for
the firm) or to maximize net social benefit (for the social planner).
A useful check therefore is to ask whether the solution achieved
through marginal analysis actually maximizes the objective (profit
or net social benefit). If not, we had better go back and check
our analysis.

9. Posin, supra note 1, at 102, 110. Note that when 49 is substituted into
this expression we get 7.85 rather than 5. This is because the 5 we calculated
above is the marginal opportunity cost between u=48 and u=49 while the 7.85
is the marginal opportunity cost at 49. Graphically, we can express this in terms
of the opportunity cost curve. The 5 represents the slope of the line connecting
the points at u=48 and u=49 and the 7.85 is the slope of the tangent at u=49.
Also note that since we are using whole number amounts (and rounding in the
maximizing direction) the marginal opportunity cost becomes positive after u = 48
rather than after some fractional amount. I use whole number amounts because
Posin did so. Using real numbers, however, will yield similar results.
10. I believe it was Einstein who said that it is important to make things
as simple as possible, but no simpler.

